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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FETCHES FIDO: NEW
APPROACHES TO DOG SNIFFS
Robert M. Bloom* & Dana L. Walsh"
INTRODUCTION
In Florida v. Jardines, the Court dealt with the issue of
whether a drug-sniffing dog on a porch of a home qualifies as a
search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.2 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a five-to-four
majority, opted for a property-based approach, noting that "[o]ne
virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it
keeps easy cases easy."3 The Jardines approach stems from the
Court's 2012 property approach in United States v. Jones.4 Jones
held that physically mounting a GPS receiver onto the
undercarriage of an automobile was a search.5 In this way the
Court reinstituted a property concept and added to the subjective
expectation of privacy tests created by Katz v. United States.6 While
this approach made Jardines an "easy" case, it left many
unanswered questions with regard to the relationship between dog
sniffs and the Fourth Amendment.
Jardines involved the use of Franky, a drug-detection dog, at
the door of Mr. Jardines's home to investigate whether drugs were
present.7 The Court previously characterized a dog sniff as "sui
generis," holding that a canine sniff is unique from other search
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I wish to thank
Alexandra IVitropoulos of the class of 2015 for her valuable editing assistance. I
also acknowledge with gratitude the generous support provided by the R.
Robert Popeo Fund of Boston College Law School.
** Boston College Law School, J.D. May 2013.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
2. Id. at 1413-14.
3. Id. at 1417.
4. 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)
5. Id. at 949.
6. 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). The Court in Katz held that a recording
device placed on a public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which the
defendant relied and violated his expectation of privacy, therefore constituting a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. In adopting this approach, the Court
seemed to repudiate a property approach. See id. The Katz Court stated that
the '"trespass' doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id. at 353.
7. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18.
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techniques. 8 The Court mentioned two reasons for this sui generis
characterization: first, the intrusion is limited and second, the dogs
only detect contraband.9 Utilizing this sui generis characterization,
the Court maintained that dog sniffs of luggage at an airporto or of
lawfully stopped vehicles are not searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Consequently, when police activity is not
regarded as a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, officers do
not need a warrant or any justification to utilize canine drug-
detection units to discover contraband or illegal activities. 12
The Supreme Court's previous cases involving drug-detection
dogs, however, did not address the question of a sniff at a person's
home.13 The fact that a home is involved raises additional concerns
because the home is seen as having a significant expectation of
privacy, or, as Justice Scalia has characterized it, the home is at the
"very core" 14 of the Fourth Amendment. 5  Additionally, scientific
data that emerged in recent years suggests that drug-detection dogs
are not as reliable as police and judges initially thought, 16 thus
squarely putting into question the dogs' ability to sniff contraband
consistently. False alerts to legal substances or errors made by
handlers indicate that dogs are not completely accurate and are not
8. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (citing United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). The issue of dog sniffs in Place, it should be
noted, was only discussed as dicta; the Court ultimately held that there had
been a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the defendant was made to
wait over ninety minutes in the search of her suitcase. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
As Justice Blackmun explained in his concurring opinion: "Neither party has
had an opportunity to brief the [the issue of dog sniffs] . . . [a]lthough it is not
essential that the Court ever adopt the views of one of the parties, it should not
decide an issue on which neither party has expressed any opinion at all. The
Court is certainly in no position to consider all the ramifications of this
important issue." Id. at 723-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
9. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; Place, 462 U.S. at 707. At the heart of the
Court's explanations of dog sniffs in both Caballes and Place is the proposition
that dog sniffs are sui generis because their reaction is only to the presence or
absence of contraband. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Court in Place explained further that "the canine sniff is sui generis. We
are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the
manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure." Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
10. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
11. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
12. See id.; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
13. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 45 (Fla. 2011).
14. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). Justice Thomas, an
originalist like Justice Scalia, also joined in the opinion of Jardines. Id. at
1412.
15. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
16. See infra notes 125-62 and accompanying text.
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the same as a chemical test that reveals the scientific nature of a
substance.17
This Article seeks to answer the hard questions left unanswered
by Jardines. What if the dog sniff in this case occurred on a public
sidewalk? Would the expectation-of-privacy analysis provide the
answer? Should a dog sniff be like a thermal-imaging device pointed
at a home similar to the Kyllo decision? 18 What if a dog sniffs a
person in a public place? This Article will analyze the future of dog
sniffs in light of Jardines and explore the sui generis nature of dog
sniffs, in particular the notion that dog sniffs only discover
contraband.19 It should be pointed out that this Article does not
deal with utilization of dog sniffs in a terrorist situation.20
Part I describes the Supreme Court's jurisprudence involving
drug-detection dogs leading up to Jardines including the Jones case
and the holding of Jardines.21 Part II discusses what Jardines
failed to dO22 and further argues that the underlying proposition
concluding that the uniqueness of dogs should be questioned and
dogs should be treated like other enhancement devices under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 23 Finally, Part III argues that, because
drug-detection dogs are an important investigatory tool and a lesser
intrusion than other searches, the balancing test and reasonable
suspicion standard found in Terry v. Ohio24 dealing with intrusions
less than an arrest or intrusive searches should govern.25
17. See infra notes 125-62 and accompanying text. As explained by Justice
Souter: "The infallible dog ... is . .. a legal fiction." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
18. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that the police could not use a
thermal-imaging device to look inside a person's home to detect marijuana
growth).
19. See infra notes 125-62. As will be examined, research indicates that a
dog's senses alert to more than just contraband. A search of a person's home
also potentially undermines a second premise underpinning the Court's dog-
sniff jurisprudence, that a canine sniff is so nonintrusive that we need not be
concerned about Fourth Amendment implications. Infra notes 163-96 and
accompanying text.
20. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
21. See infra notes 27-119 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 120-61 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 124-61 and accompanying text.
24. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
25. See infra notes 162-95 and accompanying text. The Court in Terry held
that the "stop and frisk" techniques used by police were a lesser intrusion than
an arrest, and given the officer's reasonable suspicion, based on experience, that
a crime was about to occur, he was justified in his stop and did not violate the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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I. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON DRUG-DETECTION DOGS & FLORIDA
V. JARDINES
Men have exploited dogs' keen senses of smell for generations to
ferret out crime.26  Police forces have adopted this practice by
training dogs to detect drugs and other contraband, raising
questions about the applicability of the Fourth Amendment and its
prohibition against unreasonable searches. 27 This Part outlines the
history of Supreme Court case law involving drug-detection canines,
including the Court's unwillingness to hold that a drug-detection
dog sniff implicates the Fourth Amendment; United States v. Jones,
the decision most relied on by the Jardines majority; and finally, the
holding of Florida v. Jardines and how it will likely be applied in the
future.
A. The Supreme Court's Previous Case Law on Canines Sui
Generis
The Supreme Court has addressed the Fourth Amendment
implications surrounding police officers' use of trained narcotics-
detection dogs and has held that because a sniff by a drug-detection
dog is sui generis, it is not a search.28 The Fourth Amendment
protects persons from "unreasonable governmental intrusions into
their legitimate expectations of privacy."29 Utilizing this standard,
the Court has found the Fourth Amendment applicable and
inapplicable in a variety of cases.30  For example, under this
standard, when the Court found that a reasonable expectation of
privacy existed, it restricted the police's warrantless use of devices
to record telephone conversationS31 and the warrantless use of
26. Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of
the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 25-26 (1990) (explaining that dogs
have been used "in hunting slaves, tracking down fugitives, and hunting game,"
as well as "during Prohibition to track down moonshiners"); see also Debruler v.
Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Ky. 2007) ("It is a matter of common
knowledge . . . that dogs of some varieties (as the bloodhound, foxhound,
pointer, and setter) are remarkable for the acuteness of their sense of smell and
for their power of discrimination between the track they are first laid on and
others which may cross it." (quoting Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W. 143, 145
(Ky. 1898)).
27. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
28. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
29. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; Place, 462 U.S. at 706-07.
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
1274 [Vol. 48
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thermal-imaging devices aimed inside a person's home. 32 Activity
not protected under the Fourth Amendment includes warrantless
searches of trash,33 planting a beeper in a container in the public
domain,34 and canine sniffs of a person's luggage at the airport 35 or
during a traffic stop.36
In the 1983 decision of United States v. Place, the Court noted
that a dog sniff of a person's luggage at the airport did not constitute
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.37 The
Court characterized the canine sniff as sui generis because the
limited intrusion resulting from the sniff only discloses the
"presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item."3 8 The Court
observed that the person's luggage did not even need to be opened,
and the only items that the dog could expose with the sniff were
contraband.39 The Court further emphasized the limited scope of
the dog's search, describing the procedure as "limited both in the
manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of
the information revealed. . . ."40 However, the actual holding in
Place had more to do with the extended detention of the luggage
(ninety minutes) than the dog sniff.4 1
The Court reiterated the dog-related dicta from Place in its 2000
decision City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,42 a case resulting from an
administrative checkpoint search for the purpose of discovering
drugs.43 The Court stated, "The fact that officers walk a narcotics-
detection dog around the exterior of each car ... does not transform
the seizure into a search."44 Much like much of the language in
Place, however, this quote was not crucial to the decision as the
32. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001) (holding that police
use of the Agema Thermovision 210, a thermal-imaging device, directed toward
the defendant's home violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches).
33. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1988).
34. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). The Court in Knotts,
however, specifically noted that the police had not used the beeper to track the
defendant inside his home, preserving the traditional expectation of privacy
within one's home. Id. at 282.
35. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
36. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
37. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 ("In these respects, the canine sniff is sui
generis.").
38. Id.
39. Id. ("[D]espite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something
about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This
limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to
the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more
intrusive investigative methods.").
40. Id.
41. Id. at 710; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
42. 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
43. Id. at 32.
44. Id.
2013] 1275
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Court ultimately held that the stop for drug-detection purposes in
Edmond violated the Fourth Amendment because of the nature of
the stop itself (to discover drugs), not because of the use of a
narcotics-detection dog during the stop. 4 5
In the 2005 Illinois v. Caballes decision, the Court, adopting the
language from Place, confirmed that a dog sniff is sui generis.46 In
Caballes, a police officer stopped a speeding vehicle on the interstate
highway.47 It was a legitimate traffic stop, and when the officer who
stopped the car reported the incident to the dispatcher, a police
drug-interdiction team located nearby went to the scene with a
drug-detection dog.4 8 The Court found that the immediacy of the
dog's arrival did not extend the scope of the stop. 4 9 The Court
emphasized the fact that the drug-detection dog could only detect
narcotics (contraband).50 The majority relied on its decision in
United States v. Jacobson, where the Court had previously held that
a chemical test performed on a packet of cocaine was not a search
because the test merely alerted the officers to the presence of illegal
narcotics. 51
The Caballes Court noted that governmental action "that does
not 'compromise any legitimate interest in privacy' is not a search
subject to the Fourth Amendment."52 In Caballes, the initial seizure
on the highway was lawful because the police officer had probable
cause.53 Subsequently, because the dog that appeared on the scene
could only detect contraband, the passenger had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in his vehicle. 54 Consequently, the Court held
the dog sniff was not a search.55 The Court dismissed arguments
that high error rates and false positives undermine the idea that
these dogs detect only contraband because the record of the lower
45. See id. at 41-42 ("Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis
narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment.").
46. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (citing Place, 543 U.S. at
707).
47. Id. at 406.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 408.
50. Id. at 409 (citing Place, 543 U.S. at 707).
51. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984). The Court in
Jacobsen also cited Place for the proposition that there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in contraband. Id. at 124 (citing Place, 543 U.S. at 707).
52. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 408-09. The Court noted that the result might be different if the
initial seizure was unlawful. Id. at 407-08. The Illinois Supreme Court had
previously held that the use of a canine during an unlawful traffic stop and the
subsequent discovery of contraband were unconstitutional. Id. (citing People v.
Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002), overruled on other grounds, People v. Bew, 886
N.E.2d 1002 (Ill. 2008)).
55. Id. at 409.
1276 [Vol. 48
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court was devoid of this issue.56 Thus, the Court gave short shrift to
Justice Souter's argument that, unlike the chemical test in
Jacobson, a dog sniff did not have the certainty associated with a
chemical test.57 Justice Souter explained that the reason for the sui
generis characterization of a dog sniff was two-fold: the limited
nature of the intrusion and the determination of contraband.58
Post-Caballes, police officers may use trained drug-detection
dogs to expose contraband that would otherwise be hidden from the
public during a lawful traffic stop because such action does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests.59 A key distinction the Court
seems to make is that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy
in contraband.60 This strongly suggests that there is an expectation
of privacy in noncontraband. In addition, the conclusion that dog
sniffs are sui generis rests upon the presumption that drug-detection
dogs can only detect contraband, which scientific data shows may be
a false premise.6 1
This expectation of privacy approach had made it difficult to
predict what police activity would be governed by the Fourth
Amendment.62 This all changed in 2012 with the majority opinion of
Justice Scalia in United States v. Jones, which analyzed the Fourth
Amendment under common law trespass standards.63 The Court
held that the government's installation of a global positioning device
("GPS") on a person's vehicle and the use of that device to monitor
the vehicle's movements constituted a "search."6 4 Justice Scalia
emphasized that the government's physical intrusion on the vehicle
for purposes of obtaining information would have been considered a
56. Id.
57. Id. at 415-16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 410-11. It is important to note that Caballes' dog sniff reasoning,
unlike Place and Edwards, was essential to the holding.
59. Id. at 408. The Court discussed how this holding is "entirely
consistent" with its earlier decision in Kyllo v. United States, where the Court
held that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana
plants inside a home constituted an unlawful search. Id. at 409 (citing Kyllo,
533 U.S. 27 (2001)). The majority stated that the device's capability of detecting
lawful activities inside the home was critical to Kyllo. Id. at 409-10. In
Caballes, however, the Court held that a "dog sniff conducted during a
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the
location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not
violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 410.
60. See id. at 409-10 (discussing the categorical difference between the
expectation of privacy for a lawful activity versus the "nondetection" of
contraband).
61. See infra notes 122-53 and accompanying text.
62. "Katz . .. has often been criticized as circular and hence subjective and
unpredictable." Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 34.
63. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
64. Id. at 949.
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search when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. 65 Justice Scalia,
an originalist, argued that the Fourth Amendment had a close
connection to property rights given the insertion of the phrase "in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects" to the phrase prohibiting
"unreasonable searches and seizure" by our founding ancestors. 66
This is particularly relevant because the Court applied the
reasoning in Jones to Jardines and concluded that the use of a drug-
detection dog at a person's front door qualifies as a search.67
B. Lower Courts Tackle the Issue of Dog Sniffs
Lower courts have confronted police use of drug-detection dogs
and have analyzed the issue in light of the Supreme Court case law
on the subject. Three particularly relevant cases are the Second
Circuit's United States v. Thomas68 case, the Maryland Court of
Appeals' Fitzgerald v. State69 case, and the Florida appellate court's
State v. Rabb70 decision. In Thomas, the police obtained a search
warrant for the defendant's apartment.71 The magistrate who
granted the warrant relied on the officer's affidavit, which claimed
that probable cause existed in part because of a canine sniff outside
the defendant's apartment that indicated drugs were inside. 72 The
defendant argued that the canine sniff was indeed a search and that
the search was without probable cause and a warrant. 73 Because
the magistrate relied in part on the illegal canine information, the
Second Circuit held that the warrant was invalid.74
Like the Second Circuit in Thomas, the District Court of Appeal
in Florida's Fourth District held in State v. Rabb that a canine sniff
at the door of the defendant's home constituted an unreasonable
65. Id. Note that this approach did not replace the Katz expectation of
privacy approach, it merely added to it. Id. at 952.
66. Id. at 949.
67. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (referring to Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945). Justice Scalia in Jardines turned to the wording of the Fourth
Amendment in which the house is specifically referred to. Id.
68. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
69. 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
70. 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
71. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1365-66.
72. Id. at 1366.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1367. The Second Circuit noted that the other information in the
affidavit was not enough to establish probable cause with the dog sniff. Id. at
1367-68. The Second Circuit also noted that there is a distinction between a
dog sniff at the airport, in a public place, and a sniff at a person's home. Id. at
1366-67. Although a drug-detection dog will only disclose the presence or
absence of narcotics, the dog sniff is still "a way of detecting the contents of a
private, enclosed space." Id. at 1367. The Second Circuit in Thomas was
willing to grant a "heightened expectation of privacy" inside a dwelling and
confined Place to its facts, a dog sniffing luggage at an airport. Id.
1278 [Vol. 48
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search.75 A search warrant was granted to search Rabb's home
based in part on a drug-detection dog's alert to narcotics at Rabb's
residence.76 Much like the court in Thomas, the court distinguished
Place and Caballes, describing the situations in both of those cases
as less intrusive than a canine sniff upon a person's home.77 The
court held that the other evidence, without the canine sniff, was
insufficient to establish probable cause and granted the defendant's
motion to suppress evidence found based on the faulty warrant.76
Further, using Thomas as persuasive precedent, the court explained
that by using a drug-detection dog, police are able to get information
about the inside of a person's dwelling that they would not be able to
obtain with only their own senses.79 Because the defendant had a
legitimate expectation that the inside of his home would remain
private and would not be "sensed" from the outside, the use of the
drug-detection dog impermissibly intruded on his expectation of
privacy, and the sniff constituted a Fourth Amendment search.80
The court thus held that the information gathered from the dog sniff
could not be used in an application for a search warrant. 81
The Maryland Court of Appeals confronted the Fourth
Amendment implications of a canine sniff in Fitzgerald v. State.82
After receiving an anonymous tip, officers went to an apartment
building with a drug-detection dog.83 The dog and his handler went
to four apartment doors, and the dog only alerted at the defendant's
apartment.84  The Maryland court rejected the distinction the
Second Circuit had made in Thomas that distinguished houses from
cars and public areas.85 The court held that so long as a handler
and dog were lawfully on the premises, a dog sniff of the outside of a
home is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.86
75. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). It is
important to note that this case was decided after the Supreme Court's Caballes
decision.
76. Id. at 1178.
77. Id. at 1183-84, 1188-89. The court also noted the difference between a
dog sniff at a hotel, which would be less intrusive, and a dog sniff at a person's
home. Id. at 1185-86; see also Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366-67 (discussing the
intrusion of a dog sniff on privacy at one's residence).
78. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1188.
79. Id. at 1191; see also Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367 (noting a police dog may
sense what is inside a dwelling where a person may not).
80. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1184, 1188, 1192; see also Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367
(finding a canine sniff at a residence constituted an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment).
81. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1187; see also Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367 (finding
the information from the dog's alert could not be used to support a search
warrant).
82. 864 A.2d 1006, 1017 (Md. 2004).
83. Id. at 1008.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1016-17.
86. Id. at 1017.
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The court distinguished Kyllo v. United States,87 and discounted
the seeming importance that the Supreme Court had placed on the
expectation of privacy in the home, by explaining that a dog is not
technology like the thermal imager used in Kyllo. 8 Additionally,
the court held that Kyllo is not applicable in the context of dog sniffs
because dogs are not "advancing technology;" a dog's sense of smell
has essentially remained constant over the years.89 This Article,
although not discounting this approach, will point out that a dog
sniff is nonetheless an intrusion implicating the Fourth
Amendment.
C. Florida v. Jardines
The majority's five-to-four opinion in Jardines does precisely
what Justice Scalia intended-it keeps easy cases easy. 90
Nevertheless, it has left many issues that are not easily resolved
lurking in the future, though ironically, the Court directly addressed
the use of canine sniffs for the probable cause determination. 91
Jardines involved a police officer who conducted a warrantless
search of Mr. Jardines's home using a drug-detection dog and
discovered live marijuana plants.92  A detective received an
unverified tip that Jardines's home was being used to grow
marijuana, and one month later, two officers went to the home with
87. See 533 U.S. 27 (2001). In Kyllo, the Agema Thermovision 210 was
used to scan a home in order to determine whether the amount of heat
emanating from the house was consistent with the use of high intensity lamps
typically used to grow marijuana indoors. Id. at 29. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, explained that "'[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment
'stands the right of a man to retreat into his home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusions."' Id. at 31 (citing Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
88. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1015-16. "A dog has commonly been referred to
as 'man's best friend,"' and is considered part of the family. Id. at 1015. Dogs
could hardly be considered just some sort of technological device like a car,
computer, or thermal imaging machine. Id.
89. Id. at 1015-16 ("Even taking into account potential gains from
evolution, breeding, and improved nutrition, the limits to dogs' future ability to
smell are not far from the current limits.").
90. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
91. Also in 2013, the Court decided Florida v. Harris, another case
involving drug-detection dogs. 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013). In Harris, a unanimous
Court held that an alert by a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides
probable cause to search the vehicle, without requiring the state to provide
extensive records to establish the dog's reliability. Id. at 1055-56. The Court
favored a practical and flexible standard to evaluate probable cause as opposed
to rigid, bright-line tests. Id. The Court's decision in Harris merely preserved
the status quo allowing officers to use alerts by drug-detection dogs as probable
cause at least at a lawful traffic stop. Id. at 1057. It did not, however, answer
the question of whether a drug-detection dog's alert at the doorway of a home
was a search.
92. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413-14.
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a drug-detection dog and approached the house.93 The dog alerted to
contraband at the front door, and one detective went to the front
door and smelled marijuana. 94 The detective obtained a search
warrant and conducted a search, and the police confirmed that
marijuana was being grown in the house.95 Jardines moved to
suppress the evidence seized inside his home.96 The motion was
initially granted by the trial court but was subsequently reversed.97
The Court granted certiorari to answer the narrow question of
whether the officers' behavior at Jardines's home was a search
under the Fourth Amendment.98 The Court concluded that there
was a physical intrusion in the area surrounding Jardines's home
when the officers brought the dog there to gather information.99
Because this was not explicitly or implicitly authorized by the
homeowner, the Court ultimately held that the government's use of
trained drug-detection dogs to investigate a home and its immediate
surroundings was a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.100  The Court emphasized the importance of the
privacy of the home and the curtilage as constitutionally protected
areas and subsequently analyzed whether the homeowner had
explicitly or implicitly granted the officers a license to be there.' 0 '
The Court concluded that Mr. Jardines had not granted the officers
a license and noted that "background social norms that invite a
visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a
search."102 Visitors knocking at the door or girl scouts selling
cookies are distinguishable from an officer with a dog investigating
for incriminating material, explained the Court.103
The Court also noted that the question before it was whether






98. Id. at 1414. The Florida Supreme Court had analyzed the federal case
law surrounding the issue and held that it was not applicable to a dog-sniff test
conducted at private residence. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 45 (Fla. 2011).
The court noted that "all the sniff and field tests in the above [federal] cases
were conducted in a minimally intrusive manner upon objects-luggage at an
airport in Place, vehicles in Edmond and Caballes, and a package in transit in
Jacobsen-that warrant no special protection under the Fourth Amendment."
Id. The Florida court noted that the previous cases involved tests that were not
susceptible to being employed in an arbitrary way, and the objects were "seized
and tested in an objective and nondiscriminatory manner," with no "evidence of
overbearing or harassing government conduct." Id.
99. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
100. Id. at 1417-18.
101. Id. at 1414-16.
102. Id. at 1416.
103. Id. at 1415-16.
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depends on whether the officers had an implied license to enter the
porch, which in turn depends on the purpose for which they entered
the curtilage.104 Because the purpose of the officers' behavior was to
conduct a search, there was no implied license granted by the
homeowner.105 The Court rejected using a Katz-type analysis in
looking at Jardines's expectation of privacy in the area; instead, it
relied on reasoning from Jones and used a property-based
understanding of the Fourth Amendment to decide the case. 106 This
eliminated the need to go into a Jacobsen analysis that would likely
favor admission of the evidence because a drug-detection dog is only
trained to detect contraband.107  The Court noted that it was
unnecessary to analyze Jardines's expectation of privacy under Katz
because Katz has merely 'added to, not substituted for,' the
traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth
Amendment." 08 Thus, use of the property law standard made
Jardines "an easy case."109 This, interestingly, was analogous to the
logic Justice Sotomayor used in her concurrence in Jones, which
opted for a property law approach because it was a cleaner way to
resolve the issue rather than dealing with the amorphous issue of
how long a GPS device needed to be on a car to implicate the
expectation of privacy approach.110
Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that because
drug-detection dogs have been used for centuries, their use should
not be considered a search.'1 1 Instead, the Court focused on the
physical intrusion of the home and the exploration of its details to
conclude that the officers' use of a drug-detection dog at the porch of
the defendant's home was a search.112 In her concurrence, Justice
Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, called for an
analysis under Katz's legitimate expectation of privacy test and
would have held that Kylloll3 already resolved the case.114
Furthermore, Justice Kagan equates dogs to a sense-enhancing tool
not in general public use, focusing her opinion on the analogy of a
104. Id. at 1416-17.
105. Id. at 1417.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012)).
109. Id.
110. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
111. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
112. Id. at 1417-18.
113. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). In Kyllo, a search
was found when police used a thermal imaging device pointed at the home from
a sidewalk to detect heat emanating from a house. Id. at 29. The Court defined
the thermal-imaging device as a "device that is not in general public use" and
its use to "explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion" constituted a '"search' [that was]
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." Id. at 40.
114. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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dog to a pair of super-high-powered binoculars. 115 Much like Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, she places significant emphasis on the fact
that the sniff occurred at the home. 116
Justice Alito's dissent rejects the majority's property-based
reasoning by arguing that the detective in Jardines "adhered to the
customary path" leading up to Jardines's home, and, having every
right to be there, his conduct was consequently not a search. 117 In
addition, the dissent contends that the officer did not exceed the
scope of his license. 118 Justice Alito further rejects the concurring
opinion's contention that the officer's conduct violated Jardines's
reasonable expectation of privacy, focusing instead on the Court's
previous decision in Caballes and distinguishing this case from
Kyllo.119 The dissent points out that the majority in Caballes
rejected Justice Souter's argument that questioned the ability of
dogs to sniff just contraband. 120 With regard to Kyllo, the dissent
pointed out that Kyllo was concerned with advanced technology not
in general public use; dogs, Justice Alito argued, are not a new form
of advanced technology as they had been used for centuries. 121
Although Justice Scalia never employs the word "trespass," the
idea of trespass permeates his entire opinion. The question of
whether officers can walk to the front of a person's home and use a
drug-detection dog to investigate is resolved. It is likely in response
to this that the dissent extensively analyzes the history of trespass
and finds no trespass or other property infringement in cases of dogs
approaching a house.122 What is left unanswered, however, by both
the Scalia opinion and the Kagan concurrence, is whether the use of
drug-detection dogs in places other than the front porch of a home is
also a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For
example, is an officer who walks up to a pedestrian with a drug-
detection dog that alerts to drugs performing a "search"? Or what
about an officer who walks up to a person in a bar or other public
space with a drug-detection dog and sniffs that person? Using
Justice Scalia's property-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment,
115. Id. at 1418.
116. Id. at 1419.
117. Id. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1423-24.
119. Id. at 1425-26.
120. Id. at 1425.
121. Id. at 1425; see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 1420-21. The dissent argues that "dogs have been domesticated
for about 12,000 years; they were ubiquitous in both this country and Britain at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment; and their acute sense of
smell has been used in law enforcement for centuries." Id. at 1420. The dissent
then further explains that "the Court has been unable to find a single case-
from the United States or any other common-law nation-that supports the rule
on which its decision is based. Thus, trespass law provides no support for the
Court's holding today." Id. at 1420-21.
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it would seem that these acts would not constitute searches because
there is no physical intrusion upon property of the person being
"searched."123
Nonetheless, these activities still represent an intrusion into a
person's privacy. Because a drug-detection dog significantly
enhances a police officer's abilities, it is different from an officer
walking on the street and either smelling marijuana or seeing drugs
present. The Court left open the question of what justification, if
any, the police need to use drug-detection dogs as an investigatory
tool outside the context of a porch of a home. This is especially
important as the fallibility of dog sniffs seems to have been accepted
by the Court.124
II. THE (UN)RELIABILITY AND (IN)ACCURACY OF DRUG-DETECTION
DOGS
The majority decision by Justice Stevens in Caballes
emphasized their reliance on Jacobsen and Place. "[W]e treated a
canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as 'sui generis'
because it 'discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item."' 12 5 The Court refused to consider Justice Souter's
dissenting position, pointing out that the record was devoid of facts
to support his argument. 126 This Part will show that there is ample
support for the proposition that dogs, unlike the chemical test in
Jacobsen, do not always disclose contraband.127 Because Caballes
was the only decision that actually utilized the sui generis argument
for its holding, questioning the contraband proposition should have
a significant impact on the viability of the Caballes decision as well
as the approach to dog sniffs. 128
A significant problem with the Court continuing to hold that
dog sniffs are sui generis and that their use therefore does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment is that canine sniffs do not
123. See id. at 1420-21.
124. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056-57 (2013). In Harris, the
Court recognized that while dogs are imperfect, dog sniffs can nonetheless be
used as probable cause to search "[i]f a bona fide organization has certified a
dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting." Id. at 1057. The Court
specifies that "[a] defendant ... must have an opportunity to challenge [the]
evidence of a dog's reliability." Id. The Court, however, makes no mention of
expectation of privacy.
125. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (quoting United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
126. See id. Justice Souter in his dissent, agreeing with the respondent's
brief, argues that dogs are not infallible, often make mistakes, and therefore
should not be characterized as sui generis and that an alert cannot claim the
certainty that Place assumed. Id. at 411-13 (Souter, S., dissenting); see infra
note 131 and accompanying text.
127. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
128. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
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reliably and accurately alert solely to contraband.129 Although not
substantially intrusive, dogs' sensitive olfactory senses are able to
detect smells other than contraband.130 For example, the odor in
heroin that drug-detection dogs are trained to alert to, acetic acid, is
a common chemical used in benign substances such as pickles and
glue. 31 Additionally, studies indicate that drug-detection dogs do
not alert to the illegal substances themselves, but to byproducts of
the drug.132 The source of the chemical, however, need not be
present, and only trace amounts, not bulk, are necessary for the dog
to detect the odor.133 Thus, a dog merely detects what it has been
conditioned to detect, which could be a lawful scent. This is
noticeable in the case of discerning marijuana and hashish from
objects that have similar smells, such as hemp products, juniper
trees, or firs.134
Another important factor in the reliability of drug-detection
dogs detecting only contraband is the proximity of the dog to the
illegal substance.135 For a drug-detection dog's sniff to be effective
129. See Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog:
Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB.
L. REV. 735, 755 (2007) ("Even with its superior sense of smell, it is not possible
for a dog to distinguish the scent of all contraband from otherwise legal
substances."); Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?:
Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home,
88 OR. L. REV. 829, 838 (2009) (finding that the odor that drug-detection dogs
alert to for cocaine is a byproduct of the drug, methyl benzoate); Id. at 839
(noting that methyl benzoate can be found in lawful substances, including
perfume). Furthermore, false alerts and false positives also demonstrate the
unreliability and frequent inaccuracy of drug-detection dogs. This inaccuracy
could be due to dogs alerting to lawful substances that are also the byproducts
of contraband. See Katz & Golembiewski, supra, at 756 (noting that it is unclear
whether a dog alerting to methyl benzoate is alerting to cocaine or to another
lawful substance). For example, it is estimated that ninety percent of U.S.
currency has on it traces of cocaine, and courts give very little evidentiary
weight to currency discovered with cocaine on it. See id. The reliability and
evidentiary value, therefore, of a drug-detection dog's alert to currency seems
very limited. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411-12 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1018 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the
dog here was able to detect diazepam, a generic drug for valium and a legal
pain medication).
130. See Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 129.
131. Id.
132. See Lunney, supra note 129, at 837-38.
133. Gary S. Settles, Sniffers: Fluid-Dynamic Sampling for Olfactory Trace
Detection in Nature and Homeland Security-The 2004 Freeman Scholar
Lecture, 127 J. FLUIDS ENGINEERING 189, 191 (2005).
134. Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 129, at 756 (citing an expert in
chemistry who stated that "it is impossible to Pavlovian train dogs to detect
marijuana because (1) there are more than sixty different odors for strains of
marijuana and hashish, and (2) each component has a distinct and different
odor").
135. Settles, supra note 133, at 192 ("[S]niffing is not a stand-off activity and
proximity is essential for a nose to acquire a localized scent.").
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and accurate, the dog would have to get very close to the source of
the contraband in order to detect its presence. 136 This would mean
getting very close to a person on the street and intruding on their
personal space.
The way that dogs are "trained" also helps explain their
reliability, or in some cases, unreliability. 137 Dogs are not trained
like humans to try and find a substance because it is contraband;
dogs are not motivated to find contraband at all. 13 8 Instead, dogs
are "conditioned," or induced to respond to particular stimuli in
specific ways.139 An ideal, perfectly conditioned dog would "always
respond[] to specified stimuli in a consistent and recognizable way,
yet never respond[] in that manner absent the stimuli."140 This,
however, does not happen. Dogs cannot be calibrated like machines
to always achieve consistent results.141 Consequently, some training
and certification programs put up with a degree of error in granting
the certification, and there is not a national, uniform standard.142
This lack of uniformity means that it is difficult to know what
"certification" or "training" actually means.143
False alerts can also occur because the human handler makes a
mistake, not the dog.144 Handlers may influence their dogs through
136. Id. at 199 ("[I]n order to properly interrogate chemical traces it really is
necessary for a dog to poke its nose in everyone's business.").
137. See Monica Fazekas, Comment, Pawing Their Way to the Supreme
Court: The Evidence Required to Prove a Narcotic Detection Dog's Reliability, 32
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 473, 482-84 (2012). In his dissenting opinion in Caballes,
Justice Souter states, "The infallible dog ... is a creature of legal fiction."
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter cites several cases where well-trained dogs sniffed and alerted to
contraband that was inaccurate because of either error by the handler, the dog,
or pervasive contamination on objects like currency. Id. at 411-12. Justice
Souter cited, among other cases, United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378
(10th Cir. 1997), which described a dog that had a 71% accuracy rate, and
United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997), which
described a dog that inaccurately alerted four out of nineteen times while
working for the post office and eight percent of the time during the dog's career.
Id. at 412. Justice Souter also cited United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499,
511 (11th Cir. 2003), which explained that "because as much as 80% of all
currency in circulation contains drug residue, a dog alert 'is of little value."' Id.
138. Matheson v. State, 870 So. 2d 8, 13 (Fla. Dist: Ct. App. 2003).
139. Id. at 13-14.
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id.
142. Id. ("Whereas the Customs Service will certify only dogs who achieve
and maintain a perfect record, [the] certification program [for the dog in
question] accepted a seventy percent proficiency.").
143. Id. ("These disparities demonstrate that simply characterizing a dog as
'trained' and 'certified' imparts scant information about what the dog has been
conditioned to do or not to do, or how successfully.").
144. See Brief for Respondent at 34, Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013)
(No. 11-817), 2012 WL 3716865, at *15.
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conscious or unconscious signals. 145 Courts have recognized that
handlers can influence dogs to alert even in the absence of a signal
odor. 146 The D.C. Circuit court stated that "less than scrupulously
neutral procedures, which create at least the possibility of
unconscious 'cuing', may well jeopardize the reliability of dog
sniffs."147 A potential cure to such "cuing" may be to videotape all
dog-sniff procedures, but this may not be widely adopted and might
be too difficult to implement.148
The Supreme Court in United States v. Jacobsen held that there
is no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband. 149 The Court
held that a search did not occur when a chemical test was performed
to determine whether a substance was cocaine. 150 A box had been
damaged at a Federal Express office in Minnesota, and the office
manager opened the package to examine its contents, which
contained white powder.151 This "search" did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment because private agents, employees of Federal
Express, performed the search. 152 Federal agents then inspected the
package, performed a chemical field test, and identified the
substance as cocaine. 153 Because the test could only disclose
"whether or not a particular substance [was] cocaine," the Court
concluded that no legitimate privacy interest was compromised by
the performance of such a test, even though the agents had to open
the bag to perform the test and the test exceeded the scope of the
145. See State v. Nguyen, 811 N.E.2d 1180, 1195 n.109 (Oh. Ct. App. 2004)
("Handler cues are conscious or unconscious signals given from the handler that
can lead a detection dog to where a handler thinks drugs are located.").
146. Brief for Respondent, supra note 144.
147. United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
148. See Richard E. Meyers II, In the Wake of Caballes, Should We Let
Sniffing Dogs Lie?, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, Winter 2006, at 13 ("Dr. Lawrence Myers
of Auburn University suggests that searches be videotaped when possible to
ensure that the result is reliable and not a reaction to cuing from a handler,
even when done subconsciously. The best-intentioned officer may be telling the
dog to alert without knowing it.").
149. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Jacobsen has not
so far been confined to its facts and continues to be used for cases other than
chemical tests. See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 457 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing Jacobsen in allowing for the search of computer storage materials
by government agents without violating the Fourth Amendment); United States
v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1991) (using Jacobsen and its
use of Place to find that because there is no expectation of privacy in
contraband, a dog sniff of a car is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 204-05 (10th Cir. 1990) (using
Jacobsen to allow evidence of contraband found by a dog sniff at a license
checkpoint).
150. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
151. Id. at 111.
152. Id. at 119.
153. Id. at 111-12.
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search performed by the Federal Express employees. 154 The Court
noted that a privacy interest that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable is "critically different" from the expectation that certain
facts will not become known to the authorities.155
This standard was applied by the Court in Caballes, where it
held that because dogs could only detect contraband, their use did
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search; no legitimate
expectation of privacy existed.156 Justice Brennan had warned in
his dissenting opinion in Jacobsen that such a broad reading of the
Court's prior decision would enable officers to use drug-detection
dogs to randomly roam the streets and alert the police to people
carrying narcotics at random. 15 7 Justice Souter echoed Justice
Brennan's warning in his dissenting opinion in Caballes, noting that
a rigid application of the holding that there is never a reasonable
expectation of privacy in contraband could lead to pervasive
practices by police officers that include sweeping cars and
pedestrians indiscriminately for contraband.158
Lower courts have applied the Jacobsen standard to a number
of circumstances, including cases involving narcotics. One key
lesson that courts seem to draw from Jacobsen is that the
expectation of privacy must not only be subjectively reasonable (a
necessary factor) but also objectively reasonable by societal
standards. 59 This means that the mere desire to shield activity
from the police is not enough to raise a legitimate expectation of
privacy. Another way in which courts have relied on Jacobsen is in
a more fact-specific inquiry for probable cause. In Jacobsen, the
DEA agents merely had to look at the substance (which had already
been opened by private actors) to develop their suspicion that the
bags contained cocaine. 160 Similar instances could be imagined
where officers need only look at or smell something to reasonably
154. Id. at 123.
155. Id. at 122.
156. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
157. Jacobson, 466 U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the
Court's analysis in these cases, law enforcement officers could release a trained
cocaine-sensitive dog-to paraphrase the California Court of Appeal, a 'canine
cocaine connoisseur'-to roam the streets at random, alerting the officers to
people carrying cocaine.").
158. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[A]n uncritical
adherence to Place would render the Fourth Amendment indifferent to
suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking garages and
pedestrians on sidewalks; if a sniff is not preceded by a seizure subject to
Fourth Amendment notice, it escapes Fourth Amendment review entirely
unless it is treated as a search.").
159. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 20 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (S.D. W. Va.
1998) (holding that a package addressed to an alias constituted conduct that
society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate and reasonable and there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy in such conduct).
160. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121-22.
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believe that the substance is contraband, and this may or may not
be enough to establish probable cause depending on the facts and
circumstances. 161
A chemical test, like the one performed in Jacobsen, seems very
different, however, from a sniff by a drug-detection dog, a living,
breathing animal. Although a chemical test might produce a false
positive, it is unlike a drug-detection dog that is conditioned to
detect certain substances but whose ability to be consistent one
hundred percent of the time is virtually impossible.162 Additionally,
courts interpreting Jacobsen have relied on the case for the
proposition that once a private party has conducted a search, a
government agent viewing or testing what has already been viewed
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 163 This is substantially
different than when the initial intrusion is a sniff.
In Jardines, the majority opinion did not go into a Jacobsen
analysis because the case was decided on a property-based reading
of the Fourth Amendment.164 As this Article has argued, a drug-
detection dog is unable to distinguish a lawful substance from
contraband, thereby undermining a key premise of the sui generis
rationale from Place and Caballes. Drug-detection dogs have the
potential to detect things other than just contraband, including
lawful substances.165 Instead, dogs look more like any other police
procedure subject to imperfections and against which persons should
be protected under the Fourth Amendment.166
III. REASONABLE SUSPICION REQUIRED
In Terry v. Ohio the Court recognized that certain activity
falling short of a full-scale arrest and search (known as a stop and
frisk) should be governed by the Fourth Amendment.167 Because
this activity did not lend itself to probable cause or a need for a
warrant, the Court turned to the Fourth Amendment's general
161. See, e.g., People v. Leichty, 205 Cal. App. 3d 914, 921 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that officers' viewing and smelling of a liquid substance was
enough to establish probable cause that the bottles in question contained
contraband and the officers were justified in seizing the bottles).
162. See supra notes 124-61 and accompanying text.
163. See People v. Radcliff, 712 N.E.2d 424, 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119); see also State v. Wallace, 910 P.2d 695, 703-04
(Haw. 1996) (citing Jacobsen and holding that testing packets of cocaine did not
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
164. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
165. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
166. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (establishing the standard of
reasonable suspicion for an officer to stop and frisk a person).
167. Id. at 9.
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prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures.s68  As the
court explained:
"[Wie deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-
necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observation of the officer on the beat-which historically has
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to
the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this
case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures."169
The Court thus came up with a balancing test that weighed the
government interest with the type of intrusion.170 In this way, the
Court concluded that the justification for this police activity would
be something less than probable cause-reasonable suspicion.171
In United States v. Place, the Court found a dog sniff to be sui
generis for both the manner in which the information is obtained
(sniff) and revealed (contraband).17 2 Both factors were needed for
the sui generis classification. 1 7 3 Place indicated the intrusion by a
dog sniff was less than a full-scale search, as it did not require the
opening of the luggage. 174 It is the limited nature of the intrusion
that we focus on. The Fourth Amendment should nonetheless still
govern this rubric of police conduct and be classified as a less-than-
traditional search.
Thus, although the use of drug-detection dogs is only minimally
intrusive, the Fourth Amendment should still govern their use. The
issue of suspicionless, sweeping searches using drug-detection dogs
is still a concern, even though the police may encounter practical
problems in implementing such an approach.175 These potential
practical limitations should not color the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. It seems that whether a sniff by a drug-
detection dog constitutes a "search," regardless of if the dog sniffs a
168. Id.
169. Id. at 20.
170. Id. at 20-21.
171. Id. at 10-11.
172. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Brief for the State of Florida at 28, Florida v. Jardines 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013) (No. 11-564), 2012 WL 1594294 at *28.
Dog-handler teams are not cheap and surreptitious devices that evade
the ordinary checks of "limited police resources and community
hostility" on abusive law enforcement practices. These ordinary
constraints apply. Trained drug-detection dogs are a scarce resource
that are in high demand. And, unlike the GPS device in Jones,
neighborhood-wide sweeps with numerous dogs and their handlers
would not be surreptitious.
Id. at 27-28, 2012 WL 1594294 at *27-28 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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pedestrian on the street or a house from a public sidewalk, should
not turn on the Kyllo decision as the dissent in Jardines seems to
suggest, pointing out that Kyllo was based on new technology not in
general public use.176 Further, although dog sniffs are not perfect,
they are focusing on contraband as opposed to heat in Kyllo. Thus
the intrusion is somewhat less severe. It should also not turn on
whether the police had implicit or explicit consent to be on certain
property, as Justice Scalia suggests in the majority opinion of
Jardines.177 Instead, the proper standard for determining whether
the police have the authority to use a drug-detection dog should be
reasonable suspicion.178
Similar to a Terry stop, it seems proper to require an officer to
have, based on experience, reasonable grounds to suspect criminal
activity before utilizing a drug-detection dog to investigate a
person. 179 Also, similar to Terry, where the search was restricted to
what was necessary to discover particular items, a dog sniff is
generally limited to detecting contraband. 180
The Jacobsen rationale, which would require no level of
justification for the police to use a drug-detection dog, is simply
inapplicable for dogs.181 As the Maryland court in Fitzgerald v.
State noted, dogs have been given the title "man's best friend."182
Due to this moniker, and because "across America, people consider
dogs as members of their family," the Maryland Court of Appeals
concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Kyllo was not
applicable, and one cannot analogize a dog to a machine like a
thermal-imaging device.183 The court also explained that dogs are
not an "advancing technology."184 The court went so far as to cite
Homer's Odyssey, a twelfth century statement by Richard I, and
Sherlock Holmes as evidence that a dog's sense of smell was then,
and continues to be, superior to humans'.185 Nonetheless, a dog's
sense of smell has not progressed beyond this point, unlike most
technology that humans develop, such as computers, chemical tests,
and electronics.186 Based on these premises, that a dog is not like
176. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39-40 (2001). In Kyllo the
Court found that the use of a thermal imaging devise (measuring heat) targeted
at a home was a Fourth Amendment search. Id.
177. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
178. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 30.
181. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359
(1967).
182. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015 (Md. 2004); see also supra
notes 120-61 and accompanying text.
183. Id. at 1015-16.
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technology to begin with, nor does it have the capability of
advancing, and that the dog could detect only contraband, the
Maryland court held that a dog sniff of the exterior of a residence
was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.187
Although the Maryland court seems to have been correct in its
analysis of the nature of a drug-detection dog in that it is not like a
machine, nor does it advance in sophistication like other
technologies, the court came to the wrong conclusion. It is because a
dog is not like a machine that its use by the police constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Dogs are fallible, they make
mistakes, and consequently, they do not solely detect contraband.188
Therefore, although one probably cannot satisfactorily compare a
drug-detection dog to a machine like the Agema Thermovision
210,189 the Supreme Court's analysis on the expectation of privacy in
Kyllo and other Fourth Amendment cases is relevant, though not
enough to complete the analysis. Although a dog could not detect
"at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath,"190 a dog could potentially detect alcohol, perfume, or
prescription or nonprescription drugs, which are all lawful to
possess, as well as homegrown marijuana.' 9 ' Without this major
rationale for declaring that dog sniffs are sui generis, there is an
expectation of privacy and Fourth Amendment applicability for
sniffs.
Although it could be argued that the justification for treating
dog sniffs as a nonsearch no longer exists, thus putting into question
the Caballes decision, we recognize that the Court might be inclined
to uphold Caballes and Place because the Court has recognized
lesser privacy expectations for intrusions of an automobilel 92 or of
luggage at an airport. 93 Thus, this minimal intrusion might not
require Fourth Amendment protection.194 The Jardines court left
unanswered whether a sniff of a person on a public street 95 or a
187. Id. at 1017.
188. See supra notes 140-61 and accompanying text.
189. See Kyllo v. United States 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
190. Id.
191. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
192. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
193. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
194. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (holding that a police
officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending
the completion of the stop because the additional intrusion on the passenger is
minimal); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977) (holding that
during a lawful traffic stop it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to
order the driver out of the vehicle and to preform a pat down if there is a
reasonable belief that the driver may be armed).
195. The Court has consistently held that "[v]irtually any 'intrusio[n] into
the human body"' is a search. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969, 1980
(2013) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)) (holding that
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sniff of a home from a public place1 96 require a Fourth Amendment
analysis. Pursuant to the Terry balancing test, we should take into
account the level of intrusiveness of the search (minimal) and the
importance of the use of drug-detection dogs as an investigatory tool
(high).197 Nonetheless, unlike luggage at an airport or a vehicle, a
drug-detection dog's sniff of a person seems more intrusive, similar
to a home in terms of detecting odors other than solely contraband
and the level of intrusiveness.198 Further, Justices Scalia and
Thomas would probably agree as they turn to the original wording of
the Fourth Amendment in which both houses and persons are
mentioned. Again, Jacobsen's contraband analysis is not
satisfactory because a drug-detection dog is probably not solely
smelling contraband but normal body odors as well.
A dog sniff of a person seems to meet both the objective and
subjective reasonableness requirements, suggesting that people
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons.199 Justice
Kagan's concurring opinion in Jardines would require a warrant
and probable cause for the use of a drug-detection dog.200 Although
we recognize the intrusiveness of a sniff of a person or a home, this
Article seeks to make the Fourth Amendment applicable to sniffs
and suggests a reasonable suspicion standard to attract a majority
of the Court. We also recognize the importance of drug-detection
dogs as an investigatory tool and that the intrusion is less than that
in Kyllo because dogs are conditioned to recognize contraband. 201
though a DNA cheek swab taken as the defendant was being booked was a
search, like fingerprinting or photography, it is a legitimate booking practice
that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); see also Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 295 (1973).
196. "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area."' Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
197. In King the dissenters recognized that special needs or administrative
rationale did not work when the objective of the search was for criminal
investigation. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1981-82 (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also,
Indianapolis v. Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
198. See Bond v. United States 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (indicating that
physically invasive inspection was more intrusive than a visual inspection.)
B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The
Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, that the level of intrusiveness is greater
when the dog is permitted to sniff a person than when a dog sniffs unattended
luggage.").
199. Id. ("Because we believe that the dog sniff at issue in this case infringed
B.C.'s reasonable expectation of privacy, we hold that it constitutes a search.").
200. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419-20 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
concurring).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984).
Because the protected privacy interest had already been frustrated by the
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Because a drug-detection dog's sniff is still less intrusive than other
investigatory tools, and because it is an important police practice,
the proper standard to determine the validity of such a search is
reasonable suspicion.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court had an opportunity in 2013 to revisit its
jurisprudence involving the Fourth Amendment and police use of
drug-detection dogs. At least when it comes to homes, the Court
held that a dog sniff from the porch of a home is a search under the
Fourth Amendment and that police need probable cause before
allowing the sniff to occur. 202  Nonetheless, the Court left
unanswered the question of the use of drug-detection dogs in areas
outside the home, including their use on persons on the street or in a
public place.
The Jacobsen contraband rationale does not adequately address
the issue of drug-detection dogs. The unreliability and inaccuracy of
narcotics canines suggest that they do not detect solely contraband,
and can actually alert to lawful substances. There is indeed an
expectation of privacy for dog sniffs. Without the traditional
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, including applying a
reasonable suspicion standard, the risk of indiscriminate searches of
homes, vehicles, and persons is a threat. Although drug-detection
dogs are minimally instrusive and can be useful police tools to detect
crime and illegal substances, as they have been doing for decades, it
is necessary to analyze their use in light of the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment. This requires an establishment of at least
reasonable suspicion before a dog sniff is performed.
private carrier, the Court in Jacobsen found that the seizure for testing was
constitutionally reasonable. Id. at 114-15.
202. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18.
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